Cellphone Storage Options

Many of my corporate and government clients work with classified information. The areas in which this work is accomplished prohibits the introduction of electronic items such as cellphones, laptops and smart watches. The question is how to store these items until they could be picked up by their owners upon leaving these secure areas. The most frequent solution was to install first-come/first-serve wall mounted lockers with key-operated locks. For larger facilities this could take up a significant amount of real estate. There are also several drawbacks to using this type of storage system. Individuals would lose their keys. Unfortunately, most of these locker installations were not master-keyed so someone from the security department would need to take time to pull a back-up key, assuming the individual could remember which locker they had stored their item in. There was also the need to make another backup copy of the key to replace the one that was lost. An additional problem that was encountered was that assigned personnel would simply keep the locker key so they would be assured of place to lock up their device when they arrived at work.

Yesterday I met with a client who appeared to have found a more suitable solution to this storage problem. They’re using a Robocrib TX750 industrial vending machine that works with their access control cards. You simply hold your access control badge up to the proximity reader on the front of the machine to initiate the process. You will be stepped through the process via a display screen at the front of the unit. It will prompt you to select the size of the device you want to store. After a moment the door will release and the sliders will open to reveal a space to insert your phone, laptop, etc. To retrieve the device simply hold your badge up to the reader. After a few seconds the door will release, the sliders will open and you can take your device.

The Notre-Dame Fire – A perfect storm of events resulted in a 30 minute delay in discovering the fire.

According to an article in the NY Times, the security employee monitoring the smoke alarm panel had only been on the job for three days. When the alarm came in the employee contacted a guard in the main church area and sent them to check the alarm. The guard responded back to the security employee that there was no indication of a fire. Unfortunately, it took approximately 30 minutes before they realized that the security employee had sent the guard to the wrong building – the fire alarm sensor was located in the attic area, above the main church. To get there the guard climbed 300 narrow steps but by then the fire was beyond controlling with a fire extinguisher. At that point the guard radioed the security employee to call the fire department.

Some interesting facts contained in the article: The “ponderous response plan” underestimated the speed with which the fire would spread in the attic area; To preserve the architecture, no sprinklers or fire walls had been installed; The security employee had not been replaced at the end of his eight-hour shift so was required to work a second shift; The control panel displayed a complicated string of letters and numbers – ZDA-110-3-15-1, that was code for a specific smoke detector among more than 160 individual detectors and manual alarms in the church.

Given the type and quantity of combustible materials in the upper portions of the church, the lack of sprinklers and fire walls, and the need for a person to physically respond in order to validate the alarm, any proper risk assessment should have concluded that the threat from fire was a high probability, high consequence event. The article did not indicate if or when the response plan was ever tested. Based on the events described in the article, my assumption is that it was not.

Intruders jump fence at U.S. nuclear reactor that uses bomb-grade fuel

According to an article posted to the Thomas Reuters Foundation News web page, two people jumped a security fence at a GE Hitachi research reactor near San Francisco this afternoon. According to the article a notice was received from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that intruders had “jumped” a security perimeter fence at the Vallecitos reactor in Alameda County CA this afternoon, then “escaped”, but were later “detained” outside the facility. The article is short on details but leaves one with the impression that the facility was protected by a simple fence that could be easily circumvented. While it’s still early in the reporting process, additional facts will no doubt come to light regarding the event and probably add some details regarding general security at the site. For obvious reasons details on specific safeguards employed at the site probable won’t be released but suffice it to say that the intruders would have encountered much more than a simple perimeter fence.

The NRC and its licensees use what’s referred to as Design Basis Threat (DBT) in designing security safeguard systems intended to protect against radiological sabotage and to prevent theft of special nuclear material (e.g., Plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-235). The DBT as described in detail in Title 10, Section 73.1(a), of the Code of Federal Regulations [10 CFR 73.1(a)] is basically a profile of the type, composition, and capabilities of an adversary. Each site must design their physical and electronic safeguards to defend against that level of threat. Sandia National Laboratories hosts NRC course S-201, NRC Materials Control, Security Systems, and Principals at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque NM. As part of that course, students are instructed on the development of perimeter intrusion, detection, and assessment systems (PIDAS) that typically include multiple fence lines, a variety of intrusion detection sensors, closed circuit television, perimeter lighting, and include the application of delay technology for personnel and vehicles. It is likely that the GE Hitachi site employed multiple fence lines with additional detection, delay, and assessment layers that an intruder would need to navigate before reaching the inner fence line.  The concept is that the security response force would be alerted in sufficient time to neutralize any intruders before they were able to breach any facilities containing special nuclear material.

All that being said, there have been monumental screw-ups in the past when a combination of poor maintenance, lack of adequate training and general complacency have resulted in high profile incidents at nuclear facilities in the US. During the early morning hours of 28 July 2012 an elderly nun accompanied by two fellow peace activists entered the Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge TN. After cutting their way through the outer perimeter fence at the Y-12 facility – once considered as the “Fort Knox” for highly enriched uranium, the group continued on for a mile, cutting their way through four more fences until they found themselves confronted by signs on an inner fence that indicated lethal force was authorized. Instead of departing they spray-painted messages and threw human blood on a building that housed highly enriched uranium. Shortly afterwards they approached a security officer parked in his vehicle and surrendered. For those that are interested in the details, a copy of the DOE Inspector report can be found here.

U.S. Department of Energy taking steps to limit unauthorized transfers of scientific and technical information.

Back on 1 February 2019 it was reported in the Wall Street Journal, that Dan Brouillette, Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy had notified DOE staff that they were banned from taking part in foreign recruitment programs out of concern that certain countries were gaining access to sensitive research. In a follow-up article this past Monday, the WSJ reported that the ban was formalized and expanded to include all DOE personnel and nearly all contractors.

This new policy is covered in a new DOE Order that was approved last Friday. The stated purpose of the new order is to “ensure the continued flow of scientific and technical information consistent with the Department of Energy’s (DOE) broad scientific mission, while also ensuring protection of U.S. competitive and national security interests and DOE program objectives; and limiting unauthorized transfers of scientific and technical information.”

By way of enforcement, DOE “will take appropriate actions to prohibit DOE employees and DOE contractor employees, while employed by DOE or performing work under a contract, from the unauthorized transfer of scientific and technical information to foreign government entities through their participation in foreign government talent recruitment programs of countries designated by DOE as a foreign country of risk.”

The DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence has been assigned the responsibility of developing and maintaining a list of foreign government talent recruitment programs that will be covered by the new order and based on sponsorship by a “foreign country of risk”. Unfortunately, it is a simple matter for these countries to create new recruitment programs and disguise their true affiliation.

The Global Research Network on Terrorism and Technology

The Brookings Institution will host the inaugural conference of The Global Research Network on Terrorism and Technology. This is a new independent consortium led by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in the United Kingdom. It seeks to “explore how new technologies enable and constrain terrorist activity”. How do terrorist networks operate online? What are the ethics of content moderation for technology companies? What is the interplay between online content and offline actions?

For those unable to attend they can register to watch the event online.